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“If the mind happens in space at all, it happens somewhere north of the neck. What 
exactly turns on knowing how far north?” (Fodor 1999) 
 
“… to say that neuroimaging answers only the ‘where’ questions is to confuse the 
superficial format of raw neuroimaging data with the content of the questions 
those data can answer; Neuroimagers collecting fMRI data need no more restrict 
themselves to “where” questions than cognitive psychologists measuring reaction 
times need limit themselves to “when” questions.” (Mather, Cacioppo & 
Kanwisher, 2013) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a guide to using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) to test hypotheses motivated by theories of cognition. 
This is, of course, a daunting task, as the premise itself – that fMRI data can 
inform cognitive theories – is still actively debated. Below, we touch on this 
debate as a means of framing our guide.  In particular, we argue that the 
hypotheses motivated by theories of cognition can be constrained by 
neuroscientific data, including that offered by fMRI, but to do so requires 
embellishing the cognitive theory so that it can make predictions for 
neuroscience; much the same as how testing a cognitive theory using behavior 
requires embellishing that theory to make experimentally realizable behavioral 
predictions (i.e., the process of generating operational definitions).  Moreover, 
recent years have seen the development of several new approaches that allow 
fMRI to better test neurally embellished models.  Along with a review of several 
ways of testing neurally embellished cognitive theory using fMRI, we also 
consider the inferential challenges that can accompany these approaches.  
Readers of this chapter should gain an understanding of both of the potential 
power and the challenges associated with fMRI as a cognitive neuroscience 
methodology.  As such, this guide should provide an informed basis for applying 
these approaches to the development of more powerful and explanatory 
theories of the mind. 
 
“What can fMRI tell us about the mind?” 
 
Although the history of studying the brain to address psychological questions 
has its origins at least as far back as the field of psychology itself, it seems 
undeniable that the last two and a half decades have seen a massive expansion 
in the prevalence, scope, and impact of the cognitive neuroscience approach. 
Much of this growth is attributable to the advent of a single tool: fMRI.  
 
The development of fMRI permitted psychologists to measure brain activity 
using largely the same types of tasks that they were using in behavioral settings 
and in typical healthy populations. Moreover, the method was accessible to a 
wider range of scientists than previous neuropsychological and neuroimaging 
approaches.  Thus, the use of fMRI expanded rapidly, and has also expanded the 
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scope of testable cognitive hypotheses along the way.  More broadly, fMRI has 
changed how studies of cognition affect the public – both via its reporting in the 
media, and via its influences in public policy (e.g., the Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008) and in the courtroom (Racine, Ilan & Illes, 2005; 
McCabe & Castel, 2008; Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson & Gray, 2008; Beck, 
2010; Aron et al., 2007; Roskies, Schweitzer & Saks 2013). Though not all of 
these impacts are universally positive, the impact is undeniable. 
 
Along with these changes has come a substantial amount of academic 
controversy, some of it surrounding the challenge of whether fMRI has or can 
ever inform cognitive theory. Many question whether the impact of fMRI data on 
cognitive theory has been any greater than what could have been acquired from 
purely behavioral experiments, and indeed, whether such an impact is even 
possible in principle (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1988; Coltheart 1999; 2004; 
2006; 2010; 2011; 2013; Cooper & Shallice, 2010; Bechtel, 2002; Levin & 
Aharon, 2011; Mole & Klein, 2010; Machery, 2012; Page, 2006; Tressoldi et al., 
2012; Uttal, 2001; Satel & Lillenfeld, 2013).  Some even suggest that use of fMRI 
is currently premature, and should not be pursued until a complete cognitive 
theory has been developed (Loosemore & Harley, 2010).   
 
Skepticism regarding the impact of fMRI on cognitive theory generally comes in 
two forms.  First, there are those who claim that cognition is most gainfully 
analyzed at a level more abstract than its neural implementation. By this view, 
which involves a strong assumption of multiple realizability (e.g., Marr, 1982), 
neuroscientific data only explain how cognitive processes are implemented, and 
cannot inform theories about the identities or interrelationships of cognitive 
processes. For this group of skeptics, fMRI is only the most prominent example 
of human neuroscience data. However, no other neuroscience methodology 
would fare much better in constraining cognitive theory. The second group of 
skeptics may concede that neuroscientific data could hypothetically constrain 
cognitive theory. However, they are unconvinced that the type of neuroscience 
data offered by fMRI, given its well-known limitations, is capable of providing 
such constraints.  
 
This kind of debate is important, particularly given the resources and focus on 
fMRI in the human cognitive neuroscience literature. Nevertheless, we suspect 
that many versions of this debate may remain unresolved partly because the 
strongest forms of these challenges build in a certain circularity. Specifically, 
challenges to the idea that fMRI can inform cognitive theory generally assume as 
a starting point that cognitive theories can be fully described using terms that 
are wholly independent of any and all neural implementations.  This premise, 
however, renders the argument circular: for granted, any complete theory that 
can be fully described without reference to the brain is by definition incapable of 
benefitting from brain data, because that theory manifestly makes no necessary 
claims regarding its neural implementation! To put it bluntly, such a purely 
cognitive theory would remain unaffected by neuroscience data even if it were 
shown that all of cognition occurred south of the neck – such as in the nerves of 
the bladder rather than the brain (see Buchsbaum & D’Esposito, 2008; 
Buchsbaum, 2012 for similar arguments).  So, beyond expressing skepticism 
that such a complete theory of cognition, so defined, will ever be found, we will 
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avoid this rigged debate and instead consider in what way neuroscientific data 
can be made useful to cognitive scientists. 
 
To test a cognitive theory using any neuroscience method, including fMRI, one 
requires what Coltheart (2012) has termed a “neural embellishment”.  In other 
words, a theory must make a commitment to some testable neuroscientific 
correlate of the theory.  To be clear, this embellishment is similar to the 
traditional concept of an operational definition, in that it specifies how some 
conceptual component of a model can be measured. Thus, just as a classical 
operational definition does not require a fully elaborated mechanistic model, a 
neural embellishment does not require a detailed neural implementation 
(though as we note later in the chapter, having such a model can be quite 
helpful).  
 
For example, a model in which delayed discounting relies on interaction among 
separate systems – one driven by immediate rewards and the other that 
rationally computes value – might be quite naturally embellished to predict that 
distinct neural systems will correlate with each kind of valuation. Indeed, data 
from fMRI has provided some evidence along these lines (e.g., McClure et al., 
2004). In this case, some degree of support is offered for the cognitive model 
simply by knowing that the brain handles these valuations differently – 
consistent with the theory’s most direct and natural neural embellishment. Of 
course, further work is required to verify the specificity of the link, and to test 
further embellishments (e.g., regarding the contribution of various 
neurotransmitter systems, underlying neural representations, or even more 
specific features of the system). But, such systematic reduction in uncertainty is 
part of the normal progress of science, and is not unlike that experienced by the 
purely behavioral scientist.  
 
Why should one embellish a theory? 
 
These debates about the value added by fMRI to cognitive psychology also 
sidestep a key issue: why one might want to neurally embellish otherwise 
“purely cognitive” theories.  As will be seen, the answers to this question are 
similar to why one might want to behaviorally embellish an otherwise purely 
abstract account of cognition (see also McClelland et al., 2010, and Meehl, 1978).  
While there is undeniably much value in purely cognitive theorizing, neural 
embellishment can both add inferential power and mitigate inferential risk. We 
now elaborate a partial list of reasons why a cognitive scientist might want to 
neurally embellish their cognitive theory. 
 
Neural embellishment mitigates the risk of descriptive abstractions. The 
underlying assumption of a “purely cognitive” theorist is that the final product 
of a purely cognitive psychology – i.e., any formalized theory of cognition which 
suffices to explain all behavior – will be an explanation of the emergent 
phenomenon that the brain (or brain and body together) implements.  But this is 
far from guaranteed, even if the formalized theory is accurate to an arbitrary 
degree.  For example, Ptolemy’s system of epicycles can explain planetary 
motion (or indeed any continuous and periodic motion; Hanson, 1960) to 
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arbitrary accuracy1, but it is still an utterly wrong theory of planetary motion in 
terms of the underlying physical dynamics.  Similarly, the cognitive ontology 
entailed by classic cognitive psychological theories could amount to mere 
descriptive abstractions – i.e., mere approximations of the features that emerge 
from real underlying cognitive processes. The danger here is that these 
abstractions could lead research programs towards phenomena that do not have 
physical reality whatsoever, in the same way that Ptolemaic epicycles could 
have lead astronomers to search the sky for orbits that do not exist (McClelland 
et al., 2010). 
 
Out-of-sample tests can help resolve 
model mimicry. Model mimicry – 
whereby dissimilar models can 
predict similar things for a given 
data set – may often thwart 
progress in some theoretical 
controversies (e.g., Greenwald, 
2012). Model mimicry occurs 
because, in general, theory is 
underconstrained by data (Goel, 
2005; Pylyshyn, 1979), and 
numerous theories can be adapted 
to account for any existing set of 
data (Figure 1). But by testing a 
theory beyond the sample domain it 
has already been designed to 
account for – in our case, by 
neurally embellishing an otherwise 
purely cognitive theory – one can 
distinguish models that might 
normally make similar predictions (e.g., for within-sample tests; see also White 
& Poldrack, 2013). 
 
Purely cognitive theories rest on non-falsifiable assumptions.  The justifying 
assumption of purely cognitive theories is a form of multiple realizability: that 
neural “hardware” can always support a viable cognitive account (e.g., at Marr’s 
algorithmic or computational levels of description; 1982). But for this 
assumption to be categorically correct, the brain (or at least those parts involved 
in the cognitive process of interest) must be shown to be (at least) equivalent to 
a Universal Turing Machine (Henson, 2005; Eliasmith, 2003).  In this way, pure 
cognitive theorizing relies on an assumption that the brain or its relevant parts 
are computationally universal – yet because this implementation is not 
specified, the assumption of its universality also cannot be falsified (see also 
Searle, 1990 and Bechtel & Mundale, 1999 for similar arguments). 
 
Multiple realizability does not imply infinite realizability.  Even if there are many 
possible implementations of a given process, there may not be an infinite 
                                                        
1 A particularly compelling example of the risk of descriptive abstractions can be seen here: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QVuU2YCwHjw 
Figure 1. Model mimicry can thwart model 
comparison on the basis of existing data, but 
models can often be more productively 
compared with an out-of-sample test.  Such 
tests require that at least one theoretical 
model can be embellished in whatever way 
is necessary to make this new domain 
relevant. 
Within-Sample Data Out-of-Sample Test 
Model 1 Model 2 
Behavioral Domains Neural Domains 
Degree of Embellishment 
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number of them.  For example, while a purely symbolic representation of mental 
imagery might conceivably be subserved by any of many different cortical areas, 
it is exceedingly unlikely to be subserved by primary visual cortex, which is 
known to encode visual features in a depictive manner.  Thus, the necessity of 
primary visual cortex for mental imagery argues strongly against the notion that 
purely symbolic representations (as opposed to at least partially depictive) 
subserve mental imagery (Kosslyn et al., 1993).  The broader point is that even if 
there are numerous viable implementations of a given cognitive theory, there 
may nonetheless be neural data that are informative by virtue of being 
inconsistent with that theory (Houng, 2012; Henson, 2005).  
 
Integrative work succeeds. The possibility that the mind can be independently 
explained at multiple levels of analysis is sometimes taken as a recommendation 
for scientific inquiry (Churchland & Sejnowki, 1998; Churchland, 1988; Colombo 
& Series, 2012; Haig, 2005) even though the history of science amply 
demonstrates that integrative work, spanning multiple levels of analysis, is a 
particularly productive agenda (see Bechtel, 2002 and Bechtel & Richardson, 
2010 for similar arguments).  
 
Good theories usefully predict (and explain) testable experiments. Many useful and 
testable predictions are implementational in nature – e.g., the effects of various 
drugs, or of aging. A very useful cognitive theory should explain those 
phenomena. This is not a qualitative departure from existing cognitive theories, 
because such theories have already been embellished to explain other 
implementational details of the system. This includes, to name just one general 
example, the influence of the human body’s structure on the cognitive system 
(e.g., Rumelhart & Norman, 1982; Lohse, Jones, Healy & Sherwood, in press). 
Embellishing cognitive models to account for known biology not only makes use 
of this rich source of data, but also enables a model to make predictions 
regarding direct manipulations of the biology itself (e.g., via transcranial 
magnetic stimulation or targeted pharmacological manipulations) – 
manipulations that are crucial for the progression of both basic science and 
applied work alike. 
 
Neuroscience needs theory. Neuroscience is accumulating a trove of data. But in 
the absence of neurally-embellished cognitive theories, this endeavor can 
sometimes resemble a kind of vacuous phenomenology, or “explanationless 
collections of observations — that is, mere 'stamp collecting'” (Ashton, 2013). 
Neuroscientific findings, including fMRI, obviously rely on cognitive theory to 
escape this fate (Wixted & Mickes, 2013).   
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Non-embellished theories are at a consistent explanatory disadvantage. To 
neurally embellish your theory is to enable it both to benefit from neuroscience 
data and to possibly be falsified by it – thereby allowing it to more strongly 
contribute to the progression of science.  By contrast, any non-embellished 
theory is at an immediate disadvantage.  To see why, consider the so-called 
“consistency fallacy” (Mole & Klein, 2010; Coltheart, 2013). This fallacy is 
putatively committed when 
one claims that some piece 
of evidence supports a 
theory without showing 
either how an alternative 
outcome could have 
contradicted that theory, or 
how the evidence 
contradicts another theory 
(Figure 2A). But from a 
Bayesian conception of 
evidence (Figure 2B), there 
is no such fallacy: our belief 
is rightly increased in a 
theory when an 
experiment’s outcome is 
merely consistent with it 
(Figure 2C) – even when no 
outcome could possibly be 
inconsistent with any other 
theory under consideration. 
Conversely, our belief is also 
rightly decreased in that 
theory to the extent the 
outcome is posited to be 
unlikely – even if it falls 
short of contradicting the 
theory (Figure 2D).  
 
To make this concrete, if a 
cognitive theory of working 
memory were neurally-
embellished to suggest that 
recruitment of prefrontal 
cortex was more likely than 
not during working 
memory, the clear 
involvement of prefrontal 
cortex in working memory 
(e.g., Braver et al., 1997) 
should rightly increase our 
belief in that theory – even 
though a failure to observe prefrontal recruitment would not have falsified it, 
and even though non-embellished theories make no necessary claims about the 
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Figure 2. It is no fallacy to claim that merely consistent 
evidence supports a theory. A. One theory is non-
embellished, and thus makes no differential claims about 
any outcome of an fMRI experiment. A second theory has 
been weakly neurally-embellished – it assigns slightly higher 
likelihood to some outcome. B. Bayes’ rule tells us how to 
optimally change our belief in each theory, depending on the 
outcome of our experiment (P(D)), our prior belief that each 
theoretical model was the correct one (P(M)), and the 
probability of the outcome given that theoretical model 
(P(D|M)). C. If the experiment yields an outcome consistent 
with the most likely prediction of the neurally-embellished 
model, it is generally more likely that model is correct – even 
though no possible outcome would have falsified any model 
under consideration.  D. This cuts both ways, however; our 
relative belief in the non-embellished theory is somewhat 
greater when the evidence is more consistent with the 
observed outcome. Thus, perhaps counterintuitively fMRI 
data can inform even non-embellished theories - so long as 
there is some valid neural embellishment of an alternative 
theoretical model. 
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brain whatsoever.  Put succinctly, Bayesian reasoning makes formal the dictum 
that “vague theories can be only vaguely right” (Gallistel, 2009) because “the 
most restrictive consistent hypothesis is strongly favored” (Perfors, Tenenbaum, 
Griffiths & Xu, 2011). 
 
Neuroscience can directly test the key claims of cognitive psychology: whether 
(and which) internal states intervene between stimulus and response. A 
cornerstone of the “cognitive revolution” was that internal representations and 
transformations can be scientifically studied even if only stimulus and response 
are directly measurable.  Cognitive theories about these intervening states were 
thus behaviorally embellished, by necessity.  But if a cognitive theory is not 
expressed in terms that can also be tested neurally, then there is no way to 
observe these intervening states in isolation. In other words, we can examine 
these latent states only as they exist within a cascade of other possible 
intervening states that lead to a response – a situation where classic additive 
factors logic may be readily defied, and assumptions of pure insertion violated 
(McClelland, 1979; an assumption not intrinsic to some fMRI designs; Price & 
Friston, 1997; Badre, 2011).  The simplest example of these advantages is that 
fMRI can reliably characterize internal representations even when no overt 
response is being produced (e.g., during passive mental imagery; Reddy, 
Tsuchiya & Serre, 2010).  However, to interpret this neural response with 
respect to cognitive theory requires a neural embellishment. In other words, a 
commitment to neural implementation is required that allows one to test 
“responses” of whatever intermediate states are posited by the cognitive theory, 
without a potentially confounding influence from other processes. Hence, 
lacking a ready means of neural embellishment ultimately limits the 
opportunities available to develop and compellingly test a cognitive theory (see 
also Mather, Cacioppo & Kanwisher, 2013). 
 
We wish to emphasize again that important and fundamental progress can be 
made in cognitive science without a neural embellishment. However, we also 
think that, for the reasons given above, neurally embellishing one’s cognitive 
theory confers a number of advantages that should make doing so attractive to a 
cognitive scientist.  Thus, we now consider how one might go about 
embellishing a cognitive theory.  
 
Ways to Neurally Embellish a Cognitive Theory 
 
Theories are intrinsically underconstrained by data (Greenwald, 2012; Goel, 
2005; Pylyshyn, 1979), so any embellishment is useful if it allows more data to 
speak to a theory. But how is neural embellishment to be accomplished?  
 
There are two levels to this general problem. The first is how to express a 
cognitive theory in a way that makes some commitment to a neural 
implementation.  This part of the problem is a matter of much philosophical 
debate, with some arguing that there is no general set of laws that bridge these 
levels of analysis (see McCauley, 1998 for a summary), and others who posit 
such principles are discoverable (Bressler & Tognoli, 2006; Atallah, Frank & 
O’Reilly, 2004). The more specific problem considered here is how cognitive 
theory can be neurally embellished in a way that specifically enables an effective 
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test with fMRI. The (arguably) smaller impact of fMRI on theory in cognitive 
psychology, as compared to its practice, could imply this part of the problem is 
perniciously difficult. 
 
A rough guide to neural embellishment is in fact provided by the behavioral 
embellishments of otherwise abstract cognitive theories.  Generally, some 
experimental manipulation is predicted to influence the demands on a particular 
cognitive process (Figure 3A).  The demands placed on this process will, by 
virtue of that process’s position in some theorized cognitive architecture, exert 
an influence on behavior (Figure 3B). Both kinds of influences – the influence of 
a task manipulation on a cognitive process, and of that cognitive process on 
behavior – are often assumed to be linear with a varying slope and intercept, but 
could in principle be either more constrained (e.g., the identity function y=x) or 
more flexible (e.g., nonlinear, even non-monotonic). 
 
Both classical cognitive psychological theories as well as more recent Bayes-
inspired cognitive theories can be understood within this very general 
framework. For a classical cognitive example, consider Egeth & Dagenbach 
(1991), who showed that degradations in the visual quality of nontarget items 
produces linear costs to target identification processes, but that these processes 
can operate in parallel – consequently yielding a nonlinear (subadditive) effect 
on behavior.  For a more recent Bayesian example, consider the work of 
Gershman & Niv (2012; Exp 3), in which rewarding experiences are posited to 
exert a non-linear influence on internal reward predictions (where the 
functional form of this influence is determined, in part, by Bayes’ rule), and 
these reward predictions are in turn posited to exert a non-linear (sigmoidal) 
influence on subsequent choices. 
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Like these kinds of behavioral embellishments, neural embellishment requires 
specifying a series of functional relationships. Most  commonly, this is simply 
assumed to be a linear function relating one kind of cognitive demand to 
perisynaptic neural activity (not necessarily neural firing rate; e.g., Logothetis, 
2008; see also Ekstrom, 2010) in a particular region (Figure 3C).  Note that this 
“single-association logic” need not assume that the cognitive process of interest 
is the only cognitive process that influences neural activity in this region (e.g., 
Henson, 2005). 
 
Alternatively, neural embellishment may specify a functional relationship 
between cognitive demands and a more complex neural entity. For example, 
cognitive demands might be posited to relate to an axis in neural space – say, the 
location of peaks in perisynaptic neural activity along the rostral-to-caudal axis 
of the prefrontal cortex (e.g., Badre & D’Esposito, 2007).  One can also specify 
how cognitive demand relates to some characteristic of neural activity in a 
region other than its mean – for example its shape (Friston, Josephs, Rees & 
Turner, 1998; Glover, 1999; Woolrich, Behrens & Smith, 2004; Lindquist & 
Wager, 2007), its variability (e.g., Dinstein et al., 2012; Mueller, et al., 2013; 
Chatham, Frank & Badre, under review; Garrett et al., 2013), its correlation with 
perisynaptic neural activity in other regions (e.g, Kahnt, Park, Burke & Tobler, 
2012; Chatham & Badre, 2013), the information decodable either from the 
region (e.g., Tong & Pratte, 2012; Chatham et al., 2012; Öztekin & Badre, 2011) 
or from its correlations with perisynaptic neural activity in other regions 
Figure 3. Cognitive theories require embellishment to be tested. A. Task manipulations 
are assumed to induce some kind of cognitive demand, though this function may not be linear 
or even monotonic.  B. By virtue of a theoretical cognitive model, this demand may influence 
multiple cognitive processes.  C. These influences have some kind of effect on behavior, 
whether linear or not. D. One straightforward neural embellishment of a cognitive theory is to 
specify the relationship of cognitive demand to perisynaptic neural activity in a region, or 
correlated changes in neural activity across regions. E. The subsequent mapping to the 
measured BOLD response is well approximated by a linear time invariant system of equations 
(such as the canonical double gamma hemodynamic response function, illustrated here). 
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(Coutanche & Thompson-Schill, 2013), or the relationship of any of these factors 
to behavior or one another.  
 
Even an entire cognitive architecture’s topology or connectedness can be 
assessed if it is neurally-embellished and the appropriate graph theoretic (e.g. 
Bullmore & Sporns, 2009) or representational similarity metrics (Kriegeskorte 
& Kievit, 2013) are used. Moreover, all of these techniques are generally 
possible using standard fMRI acquisition parameters. Together, they 
demonstrate the wide range of opportunities for testing neurally-embellished 
cognitive theories with fMRI. 
 
The remaining functional relationship – from perisynaptic neural activity to the 
BOLD response actually measured by fMRI – is comparatively simpler. Though 
there are some known exceptions (e.g., Birn et al., 2001; Huettel and McCarthy, 
2000; Miller et al., 2001; Vazquez and Noll, 1998; Wager et al., 2005), this 
mapping is well-approximated by a linear time invariant system: predicted 
perisynaptic neural activity can be straightforwardly convolved with a 
hemodynamic response function (Figure 3D; see e.g., Boynton, Engel, Glover & 
Heeger, 1996; Logothetis, 2008). Thus, the difficulty in neurally embellishing a 
cognitive theory is largely in specifying the mapping between a cognitive 
resource and the spatiotemporal structure of neural activity.  As such, the core 
challenge is not distinct in kind from that posed by embellishing a cognitive 
theory to account for spatiotemporal aspects of behavior – say, reaction times 
across a subjects’ arms, hands, or fingers during the course of a task. 
 
 
Testing Neurally-embellished Cognitive Theory with fMRI 
 
How can we be sure our neural embellishments are valid? Put another way, how 
do we know when a cognitive theory is invalidated by the results of an fMRI 
experiment, as opposed to merely its neural embellishment?  It is instructive to 
note that – again – formally similar issues confront classical cognitive theories 
with behavioral embellishment. For example, a large class of mean reaction time 
patterns predicted by parallel models of cognition can be mimicked by 
appropriately-constructed serial models (Townsend & Wenger, 2004; White & 
Poldrack, 2013). More generally, a comprehensive review of 13 famous 
theoretical controversies across the past 40 years of psychological research 
suggests similarly dismal prospects for other debates, except where new 
methods can be brought to bear on existing theories (Greenwald, 2012) – 
perhaps because they act as a kind of out-of-sample test (see Figure 2, above). 
Neither neural nor behavioral embellishments are immune to this basic form of 
inferential threat, though the specific kinds of inferential threats may differ, as 
we describe below. 
 
To this end, here we provide a few approaches to testing cognitive theory along 
with select examples of how fMRI has informed (neurally-embellished) cognitive 
theories for each. We hope these examples will serve to illustrate many 
techniques in this enterprise: key ways that cognitive theory can be neurally 
embellished, how these embellishments can be inferentially tested, and the key 
assumptions that underlie these inferences – along with their boundary 
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conditions. We highlight these inferential risks not to detract from the methods 
or discourage their use. No approach in all of the cognitive or neural sciences is 
immune from inferential limits.  Rather, we view each technique as a powerful 
means of enabling future developments in cognitive theorizing, and 
understanding the strength of evidence they provide is essential to applying 
them within a research program.  
 
Univariate BOLD Dissociation Logic.   
 
A foundational question for cognitive theorists in any domain is how many latent 
states may intervene between stimulus and response for a given psychological 
phenomenon.  Dissociation logic is one approach to answering such questions of 
dimensionality.  The “logic” itself is deceptively simple: if two experimental 
manipulations have dissociable influences on a dependent measure, then the 
dependent measure must reflect the combination of (at least) two processes.  By 
contrast, in the absence of such dissociable effects, then a unitary model of the 
underlying states cannot be rejected. Many patterns of fMRI data can imply an 
underlying dissociation, though some do so more strongly than others; this 
ranking of dissociation evidence is discussed more extensively elsewhere (Dunn 
& Kirsner, 1988; Henson, 2005; Machery, 2012). However, at one extreme of the 
ranking, a single dissociation is considered the weakest evidence for 
independence. A single dissociation in fMRI, wherein an experimental 
manipulation affects activation in one brain region more than another brain 
region, can readily be accounted for by a single process model in which both 
brain areas respond to the same underlying process, but differ in their 
responsivity (for a similar argument as it applies to behavioral data, see 
Wagenmakers, Krypotos, Criss & Iverson, 2012).  At the other extreme, a cross-
over double dissociation is considered the strongest evidence of independence. 
A double dissociation in fMRI, wherein one brain region activates more for 
manipulation A than B and a second brain regions activates more for B than A, is 
more difficult to account for with only a single process (discussed further 
below). Dissociation logic has the added advantage of being tested using the 
most classic type of fMRI analysis: the simple univariate (mean) BOLD contrast 
between conditions. 
 
The domain of cognitive control is one clear example of fMRI’s utility in 
questions amenable to dissociation logic. For example, it remains controversial 
whether the human capacity for planning and abstract problem solving relies on 
a componential architecture of executive functions that support cognitive 
control (e.g., Miyake et al, 2000) or a unitary system.  Recently, it has been 
proposed that two key components underlie difficulties with planning: the 
degree to which the relative ordering of actions can be deduced directly from 
the desired goal (termed “goal hierarchy ambiguity”), and the degree to which 
these actions may require intermediate moves with interdependencies (“search 
depth;” Kaller, Rahm, Spreer, Weiller & Unterrainer, 2011).   
 
The distinction between these concepts can be clarified by example (here 
adapted from Kaller et al., 2013).  Suppose you are planning a three-course meal 
for friends. The problem of serving the courses has relatively little goal hierarchy 
ambiguity, because appetizers must come before the main course, and the main 
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course before desert. Greater goal hierarchy ambiguity is involved in the 
problem of serving the side-dishes for the main course: the goal state of serving 
a three-course meal does not directly specify this ordering. By contrast, search 
depth is better illustrated by the cognitive process required during preparation 
of this elaborate meal. If the courses and their side-dishes require overlapping 
sets of kitchen appliances, then one needs also to consider intermediate 
subgoals like washing these appliances before preparing the next side-dish or 
course. This would involve potentially large search depth conducted at the 
subgoal level, to ensure the meal was prepared efficiently. . 
 
Reaction times in a task designed to dissociate search depth and goal hierarchy 
ambiguity (specifically, a version of the classic Tower of London task) yield 
roughly additive effects of these two factors, but that result is equally consistent 
with independent cognitive resources for depth and ambiguity as it is with the 
idea that both factors require a single underlying resource due to “planning 
difficulty”.  However, an fMRI experiment revealed a cross-over double 
dissociation of these processes (Kaller, et al. 2011).  Whereas the left DLPFC 
showed a larger BOLD response as a function of goal hierarchy ambiguity than 
search depth, the right DLPFC showed the opposite effect.  
 
These findings are transparently more consistent with theories that posit a 
distinction between these subprocesses than with those that posit no such 
distinction. The effect was regionally specific – it was not observed in the nearby 
frontal eye fields – further affirming this rather specific neural embellishment.  
Finally, the inference of distinct subprocesses in planning was principally 
enabled by fMRI, given that the behavioral data were ambivalent on this point. 
 
Dissociation Logic – Inferential Risks. Kaller et al. (2011)’s results are something 
of a marvel. Such qualitative double dissociations are rarely observed 
empirically; even subtle departures from this ideal pattern, including those that 
nonetheless still show crossover interactions, render the results susceptible to a 
variety of single process interpretations.  As noted previously, this has lead to 
several rankings of the strength of evidence of independence provided by 
various dissociations (Dunn & Kirsner, 1998; Machery, 2012), though these 
rankings have not gone without criticism (McCloskey, 2001; Davies, 2010). 
 
Unfortunately, even the ideal cross-over double dissociations, like Kaller et al’s, 
leave room for uncertainty. A thought experiment makes this clear. Let us 
imagine a world where both putative subprocesses in fact produce demands on 
a single underlying process – say, the number of moves a subject must look 
ahead in order to visualize the goal.  We will also assume that left DLPFC is 
preferentially recruited when the number of look-ahead moves is small, and the 
right DLPFC is preferentially recruited when the number of look-ahead moves is 
large. If we further assume that the goal hierarchy ambiguity manipulation 
increases the number of look-ahead moves only by a small amount, and the 
search depth condition increases the look-ahead moves by a large amount, then 
these conditions can be understood as ordered along a single “look-ahead” axis 
(Figure 4A). When neural activity is taken from each region at these points along 
the axis, it can yield precisely the kind of “pure” double dissociation described 
by Kaller et al (Figure 4B).  
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The point of this thought experiment is not to seriously propose that left and 
right DLPFC are preferentially recruited at different points along a “look-ahead” 
axis. Rather, the point is that there will always be alternative single-process 
explanations: in principle, any “pure” double dissociation can be explained in 
this manner. Ruling this out requires more data.  
 
A factorial design is actually sufficient for this purpose. Thus, what was a 2 
(condition) x 2 (region) interaction can be expanded into a 2x2x2 design (Figure 
4C). In such a design, the predictions of a two-process account are 
straightforward: manipulations of either cognitive process should not affect the 
involvement of the area which is putatively insensitive to that process (Figure 
4D).  Conversely, any claim that these 4 conditions can still be ordered along a 
single axis reduces to the claim that the design matrix can be rotated so that 
each condition projects to a distinct point along that new axis. In other words, a 
single-process account posits that two putatively distinct processes (i.e., the 
orthogonal axes in the design matrix) actually have varying demands on a single 
process (i.e., another axis that “cross-cuts” the design matrix under some 
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Figure 4. Single-process accounts of a pure 2x2 double dissociation can in theory be ruled 
out with a factorial 2x2x2 design. A. Two conditions can be ordered along an axis corresponding 
to demands on a single underlying process, and the neural activity induced in two regions 
assumed to be non-overlapping and non-monotonic functions of those demands. B. These 
assumptions suffice to explain pure double dissociations across two regions in two conditions. C. 
Under a canonical two-process account, each condition places demands on separable cognitive 
processes; these can be factorially manipulated in a 2x2 design.  D. A two-process account predicts 
completely orthogonal mappings from demands on these processes to neural activity in the two 
regions.  E.  Single-process accounts amount to assuming that there is a rotation of the design 
matrix from which these conditions can be projected onto a single axis without a meaningful loss 
of information, much like the rotations used in extracting a principal component from several 
indicators.  F. Any rotation will require neural activity to follow (at least) a cubic function of 
demands on that underlying process, in one of the two areas, if the results expected from a two-
process account are observed. It is seems unlikely that such a pattern could ever be adequately 
justified theoretically by a single-process account. 
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rotation; Figure 4E). If the results expected from a two-process account are 
observed, a continued single-process interpretation must assume that 
recruitment of one of the two areas reverses twice as a function of demands on 
that single underlying process (Figure 4F) – an assumption of non-monotonicity 
so unlikely it renders a single-process explanation practically untenable.  Formal 
methods for capturing these non-monotonic patterns in real data are a rapidly 
developing approach in dissociation logic (e.g., state-trace analysis; Staresina, 
Fell, Dunn, Axmacher & Henson, 2013). 
 
In summary, dissociation logic is one of the most powerful, and indeed most 
common, approaches to testing hypotheses of dimensionality in a cognitive 
theory. This type of evidence is further strengthened by the use of fuller factorial 
designs – alternative single-process accounts must invoke increasingly complex 
forms to account for such data.   
 
Parametric Designs – An Example from Model-Based fMRI.  
 
Factorial designs are statistically powerful: they concentrate data collection to 
extreme values of a manipulation, and thereby minimize the Type II error rate. 
Yet they also entail a sparse pattern of sampling in the space of possible 
manipulations, which means the sampled data points will underdetermine the 
class of functions that may explain the data (e.g., Figure 4).  As above, additional 
confidence is granted only by the collection of additional data. One means of 
collecting additional data is to assess experimental manipulations at multiple 
continuously-valued intensities – that is, to sample the data at many 
intermediate values of some independent variable. These parametric designs 
reduce statistical power, because fewer data points are collected at the 
manipulation’s extremes, but also mitigate inferential risk: the increased 
number of samples more strongly constrains the family of curves that may 
explain them. 
 
Parametric designs have been of particularly widespread utility in fMRI, where 
non-monotonic functions are sometimes argued to be especially plausible 
(Machery, 2012), and where cognitive models can readily be tested if they make 
specific predictions about a quantity that should be important for the cognitive 
system. Parametric designs used in this latter mode are sometimes called 
“model-based fMRI,” because they represent a tight integration of quantitative 
cognitive models and neural embellishment. For example, trial-by-trial 
variations in some (putatively) cognitively-encoded value can be tested for a 
relationship to the BOLD response, in the same way that trial-by-trial variations 
in some experimental manipulation might also be tested for a relationship to RT. 
 
A particularly strong use of this approach can be found in recent work on 
reinforcement learning . One class of reinforcement theories (e.g., Daw, Niv & 
Dayan, 2005) posits that, even in the absence of reinforcement or any overt 
response, an agent can construct a model of how the various states of the world 
are interconnected, and that this model can be used to shape predictions about 
the optimal response to take in response to a future stimulus. Unfortunately, 
such a theory is very hard to test using behavioral measures, because its 
distinguishing predictions occur at a time when no overt responses are made. 
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Hence, behavioral data cannot be obviously brought to bear on the crucial 
predictions of this cognitive theory.  
 
This issue is exemplified by a study (Gläscher, Daw, Dayan & O'Doherty, 2010) in 
which subjects passively observed a series of fractal images following a 
probabilistic grammar.  By the proposed cognitive theory, subjects were even 
then constructing a mental model of these transitions by minimizing so-called 
“state prediction errors” – that is, by minimizing the difference between the 
expected and observed image at each moment in time. But because no overt 
response is made at this time, there is no opportunity to directly test the 
underlying hypothesis.  
 
Subsequently, subjects were told a few specific images would be particularly 
rewarding, and allowed to make binary choices among these images to 
maximize the likelihood a rewarding image would appear. As predicted by this 
account, even subjects’ very first choices were not random, and were consistent 
with some degree of learning of the grammar.  Of course, behavioral results at 
this point are incapable of distinguishing between the detailed proposed 
computations and any number of possible alternatives (including, for example, 
an episodic memory-mediated reconstruction of prior experiences at the time a 
choice was required). 
 
In this case, fMRI data allowed a crucial test of the cognitive theory. Here, the 
neural embellishment is quite straightforward: the assumption is that if 
cognition avails itself of the computations prescribed by the cognitive theory, 
there should be a neural correlate of these prediction errors in the brain.  That 
is, no neural region was specified, rather a whole brain search was conducted 
instead. In addition, the functional form relating these calculated prediction 
errors to neural activity was, straightforwardly, taken to be linear.  Despite 
these somewhat simplistic and sparse assumptions, the data were nonetheless 
resoundingly consistent with the proposed theory. Homologous areas across 
both hemispheres of the lateral prefrontal cortex (specifically, within the 
inferior frontal junction) were found to robustly correlate with these prediction 
errors. These effects were observed even in the absence of any reward or 
response. Again, these are precisely the kind of data unobtainable from 
traditional behavioral measures, and moreover precisely the kind of data 
necessary to test the specific predictions of this kind of cognitive theory. 
 
Parametric Designs – Inferential Risks. Like multi-factorial designs, parametric 
designs are another means of mitigating the risks inherent to basic dissociation 
logic.  They have been particularly useful in testing models that make 
quantitative predictions about changes in latent cognitive variables over time 
(e.g., Daw, Niv & Dayan, 2005, as noted above). But they come with their own 
inferential risks, and not all parametric effects are equally informative, or as 
informative as the exemplary work of Gläscher described above.   
 
Specifically, a parametric design is effectively calculating the slope that relates a 
(multi-valued, and often continuously-valued) experimental manipulation with 
the continuously-valued BOLD response.  As famously demonstrated by 
Anscombe (1973), such linear slope estimates can be identical across many 
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different underlying patterns of data, some of which may not correspond to a 
true “linear” effect whatsoever (see Figure 5A).   
 
Figure 5. Inferential risks with parametric predictors. A. Anscombe’s quartet (1973) 
demonstrates how a variety of continuously-valued data points may lead to the same estimates of 
slope, intercept, correlation, as well as mean and variance. B & C. Discretely-valued and equal-
interval predictors can be useful, but if there are an odd number of values to such predictors, the 
middle predictor will have no influence on least-squares slope estimates. By contrast, changes in 
the value of the middle predictor will always influence the intercept, and will generally influence 
the correlation estimate. 
 
A related inferential risk is the case when a parametric predictor has only three 
evenly-spaced levels, or indeed any odd number of evenly-spaced levels. In such 
cases, the middle level of the predictor has zero influence on the estimated 
slope, and thus fully one-third of the data is ignored in its estimate.  (By contrast, 
the correlation and intercept will generally be affected by the middle level of the 
predictor, as illustrated in Figure 5B&C). Thus, a linear effect alone may actually 
tell one nothing about whether the effect is truly parametric in the case of an 
odd-number of levels to a predictor.  This may be particularly problematic when 
only a small number of levels to the predictor are tested.  
 
The analysis of prediction errors (PEs) is generally robust to this particular 
problem (because they are continuously-valued). However, analysis of PEs 
illustrates another potential issue with parametric predictors which is 
particularly pernicious given the spectral properties of the BOLD response.  
Specifically, the distribution of PEs across the course of an experimental session 
is often highly skewed, with much larger PEs towards the beginning of the 
experiment (when expectations are perhaps most incorrect, relative to the true 
value), and much smaller PEs towards the end of the experiment (where 
subjects’ expectations may have converged closer to the true value). This poses 
a problem: such slow changes tend to fall within frequencies that are usually 
filtered-out by standard fMRI preprocessing pipelines, so as to eliminate the 
particularly strong sources of noise in the MR signal that occupy those low 
frequencies (Zarahn, Aguirre & D’Esposito, 1997). Conversely, the 
predominantly small and high-frequency PEs that occur when subjects’ 
expectations have approximately converged may actually fall above the 
frequency range over which BOLD can be detected with maximum sensitivity.  
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Thus, the spectral properties of MRI and BOLD can interfere with the analysis of 
some parametric regressors, particularly PEs, in multiple ways. 
 
To minimize this issue some psychologists change the value of the predicted 
entities over the course of an experiment (a “nonstationary” design) but these 
designs may introduce new problems. For example, BOLD responses due to PEs 
and outcomes are often too highly correlated to distinguish, raising the 
possibility that some model-based fMRI results previously ascribed to PEs could 
actually reflect experienced outcomes (Erdeniz, Rohe, Done & Seidler, 2013; 
Wilson & Niv, 2015). Because non-stationary designs attempt to maintain a 
constant magnitude of PEs across a task, they will actually tend to reduce some 
of what little variance can be used to distinguish PEs from outcomes.  As a result, 
nonstationary designs will tend to increase the collinearity of these terms, and 
thereby exacerbate the inferential ambiguity between PEs and outcomes. That 
said, in some cases this tradeoff may be acceptable. 
 
Finally, recent work has highlighted an unexpected feature of model-based fMRI 
regressors: the neural correlates of these regressors can be surprisingly 
insensitive to variations in the learning rate parameter of the underlying 
reinforcement learning model (Wilson & Niv, 2015). In particular, the minimum 
correlation between the correct ground-truth PE regressor and one that could 
be derived from the same model with an incorrect learning rate is R=.7. On the 
one hand, this robustness mitigates some of the inferential risks associated with 
model-based fMRI, because the neural correlates of a particular regressor are 
unlikely to be drastically influenced by deviations from the best-fitting 
parameters, which may in turn be underdetermined by available data.  On the 
other hand, this finding underscores the difficulties in distinguishing the neural 
correlates of PEs and of outcomes. For example, as noted by Wilson & Niv 
(2015), PEs are perfectly correlated with outcomes when the learning rate is 
zero and the reward distribution is fixed in an experiment. Thus, care must be 
taken in ensuring a given experimental design is capable of distinguishing the 
parameters of interest for a given model. 
 
Parametric Designs – Summary. Parametric designs are a natural means by 
which to assess the most straightforward neural embellishments of well-
specified cognitive theories, such as: do the quantitative components of a formal 
theory have direct neural correlates? A close fit to neural data might increase 
one’s belief in a theory, but there are also clear inferential risks to this simple 
reasoning.  Anscombe’s quartet and related issues in the calculation of slope 
demonstrate that similar parameter estimates might emerge from a variety of 
underlying patterns, not all of which would constitute clear evidence for the 
neurally-embellished theory.  To address these issues we recommend the use of 
parametric designs optimized to yield effects falling within the spectral range of 
BOLD’s maximum sensitivity; parametric predictors that are either real-valued 
or have an even number of equal-intervals; and the use of non-stationary 
designs, with the caveat that extra care must sometimes be taken to evaluate 
collinearity across regressors. When carried out in this way, parametric fMRI 
designs have great potential for determining whether and how task-dependent 
cognitive constructs may be neurally encoded. 
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Connectivity Analyses.  
 
So far we have discussed approaches to fMRI analysis that are merely “scaled-
up” versions of the analyses often run on reaction time. Just as we assess the 
mean RT in two conditions, or the parametric fit of RT across these conditions to 
a model’s predictions, we might assess the mean BOLD response or correlation 
of BOLD response with a parametric regressor, repeatedly so, across every voxel 
within the brain.  Such analyses are sometimes termed “massively univariate.” 
 
However, one key advantage to fMRI is the enormous richness of the acquired 
data.  This richness enables analyses with no clear or universal counterpart in 
the behavioral domain. For example, one can assess the degree to which the 
BOLD response in one region is correlated with the BOLD response in all other 
regions, and how that correlation may differ as a function of performance, 
experimental manipulations, their combination, or a host of other factors. Such 
analyses of “connectivity” are widespread, and of potentially great utility for 
testing the neural embellishments of non-modular cognitive theories. For 
example, modular accounts of cognition might be less easily embellished to 
predict or explain connectivity results than connectionism-inspired theories, 
where cognitive demands are more explicitly linked to differences in the 
correlations across neural substrates. 
 
There are many applications of these connectivity approaches, some of them to 
domains where classical approaches to cognitive theorizing could never have 
been assessed (e.g., the “resting state,” in which subjects experience no overt 
stimulus nor execute any overt response; see also Keilholz, Thompson, 
Magnuson & Pan, this volume). But a particularly successful application of 
connectivity to cognitive theory comes from the domain of working memory. 
 
Cognitive theories of working memory sometimes highlight its paradoxical 
capacities: rapid, flexible updating in certain contexts, and robust, stable 
maintenance in others (e.g., Goschke, 2003).  The incompatibility of these 
demands could imply that a computational division of labor supports them (e.g., 
Hochreiter & Schmidhuber; 1997), with distinct cognitive processes for 
updating and maintenance.  In turn, a straightforward neural embellishment of 
this hypothesis might predict a corresponding neural division of labor; for 
example, that working memory updating involves a distinct kind of interaction 
across some set of neural regions than pure maintenance (e.g., Frank, Loughry & 
O'Reilly, 2001).  Finally, if the theory is neurally-embellished to predict that 
working memory maintenance will involve the prefrontal cortex, then this 
theory can be readily tested using an fMRI technique known as 
psychophysiological interaction (PPI; O’Reilly, Woolrich, Behrens, Smith & 
Johansen-Berg, 2012). 
 
In practice PPI amounts to a fusion between parametric designs (as described 
above) and functional connectivity (to be described below). The key idea is to 
predict the BOLD response from an interaction of the neural activity in a 
particular seed region and some experimental manipulation.  The inference 
enabled by PPI is whether differences in the BOLD correlations between regions 
may differ across the various conditions of a task, or values of a parametric 
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effect. In this particular example, a PPI analysis could reveal whether working 
memory updating is associated with greater coupling across regions than simple 
working memory maintenance, as expected by this neurally-embellished theory. 
 
This study was recently conducted by Nee & Brown (2012).  Consistent with the 
neurally-embellished theory described above (which is in fact better 
characterized as an emergentist or cognitively embellished neural theory [see 
below]; Frank, Loughry & O’Reilly, 2001), this study showed increased coupling 
between the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia during working memory 
updating, relative to simpler maintenance. Unexpectedly, this was only the case 
when the to-be-updated information was particularly abstract (i.e., only very 
indirectly relevant for responses). By contrast, when updating of working 
memory with relatively more concrete information (i.e., information that could 
more directly specify a response), prefrontal and parietal regions increased 
their coupling instead.  Together the results constituted a near-ideal double 
dissociation in these changes in coupling as a function of region and condition. 
 
This pattern of results is somewhat challenging to explain using the theories 
that motivated these analyses.  One approach is to revise the neural 
embellishment rather than the cognitive theory proper; for example, perhaps 
working memory updating can be accomplished by multiple neural substrates, 
including parietal cortex and the basal ganglia. But this seemingly innocuous 
revision then calls into question the necessity of a division of labor in the first 
place, given that other evidence suggests parietal cortex is apparently involved 
in maintenance operations as well (Postle, et al 2006; Edin et al., 2009).  Perhaps 
these fundamentally different processes can take place within subregions of 
parietal cortex that are difficult to disentangle here. Alternatively, fundamentally 
different kinds of operations might take place in parietal cortex at different 
levels of recruitment.  Yet another possibility is that the underlying cognitive 
theory is itself incomplete, because it fails to account for the interaction of 
updating with informational abstraction that the brain reflects.  Along these 
lines, Nee & Brown suggest that alternative cognitive theories of the task, such 
as those which posit shifts of attention among items that have been updated into 
working memory, may be more naturally consistent with these results. 
 
Connectivity Analyses – Inferential Risks. PPI is a complex technique that is, like 
many fMRI analyses, substantially underpowered – particularly for event-
related designs. This fact reaffirms the necessity of comparing effects directly 
via formal tests of interaction, as opposed to (incorrectly) inferring that a 
significant result can be said to be different from a non-significant one 
(Niewenhuis, Forstmann & Wagenmakers, 2011).  Such concerns about power 
are exacerbated by many early PPI analyses, which neglected to encode all 
conditions of the experimental design and thus may have further inflated the 
error term (McLaren et al., 2012). 
 
More generally, the problem which PPI seeks to solve is fundamentally ill-posed.  
The inference we would like to make from a PPI analysis is that some task 
variable has induced a differential information flow between regions. But this 
requires testing whether BOLD in any region is correlated with the convolved 
interaction of neural activity in another region and the current task condition, 
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not with the interaction of convolved neural activity and the convolved task 
condition. These two expressions are mathematically distinct (Figure 6A).  
 
Unfortunately, to actually calculate the former requires blind deconvolution. 
That is one must work backwards from the BOLD timeseries to the underlying 
neural activity, a problem which can have non-unique solutions.  To see why, 
imagine that you have observed a miniscule BOLD response at some particular 
time. Does this response reflect the peak of a similarly miniscule hemodynamic 
response at that same moment, or only the trailing edge of a much earlier and 
larger hemodynamic response? Even when information is pooled across an 
entire timeseries, these questions can have multiple answers, unless identifiable 
biophysical models are used (Friston, 2011, but see Lohmann, Erfurth, Müller & 
Turner, 2012; Lohmann, Stelzer, Neumann, Ay & Turner, 2013).  Any errors 
introduced during deconvolution will also yield errors in the PPI regressor (see 
also Figure 6B), which will in turn reduce  statistical power (via regression 
dilution; Frost & Thompson, 2000). Thus, while different fMRI analysis packages 
currently take different approaches on this point, the consequences for real PPI 
results are as yet unclear.  
 
 
Figure 67. PPI requires solving the ill-posed problem of blind deconvolution, which could 
induce variable amounts of error; by contrast, well-posed alternatives are slightly though 
certifiably incorrect. A. The mathematically-correct PPI regressor is the convolved product of an 
underlying neural timeseries with a task regressor (“ground truth”; red line).  The underlying 
neural timeseries, however, is not observable using fMRI; only the BOLD response is.  One 
approach to this problem (currently taken in the SPM package for fMRI analysis) is to calculate a 
proxy for the underlying neural timeseries via blind deconvolution. This proxy is then multiplied 
by the task regressor and convolved to yield predictions that may be close to ground truth (dotted 
line) – especially when the errors introduced by deconvolution are less than 20%. A qualitatively 
similar regressor is produced by avoiding blind deconvolution altogether, instead taking the 
product of the observed BOLD timeseries and the task regressor (solid line). This approach 
(currently taken by the FSL package for fMRI analysis) is mathematically incorrect, but 
nonetheless yields reasonably accurate results. Methods of these simulations are presented in 2. B. 
The results of these approaches can differ wildly.  When avoiding blind deconvolution, a small but 
constant error is introduced into the estimated regressor (solid line) due to the mathematical 
incorrectness of the procedure.  By contrast, the consequences of blind deconvolution for the 
                                                        
2 Methodology of PPI Simulations: Figure A shows the first 100 timepoints of a 10,000 sample Monte Carlo simulation. This 
simulation assumes a canonical hemodynamic response function and i.i.d. Gaussian variables corresponding to task, neural, and 
error timeseries. Figure B shows summary statistics for multiple such simulations, each assuming various amounts of error in the 
deconvolution step along the x-axis.  On the y-axis, proportion error is calculated as (1 – R2), where R is the Pearson correlation 
between the ground truth regressor and the PPI regressor yielded by each approach. These errors are introduced either by the 
mathematical incorrectness of “No deconvolution” procedure itself (solid line), or by errors arising during blind deconvolution 
(dotted line). This latter source of error is also calculated as (1-R2), where R is the Pearson correlation between the results of 
deconvolution and the underlying neural activity of each simulation. 
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calculated regressor may be much larger or somewhat smaller (dotted line), depending on how 
much error this procedure introduces (which could vary across time, voxels, or subjects).  
 
 
PPI is but one instance of a larger class of fMRI connectivity methods. Another 
instance of fMRI connectivity methods – indeed, a class unto itself – can be 
broadly described as variations on the theme of matrix factorization. In this 
case, the matrix is made up of 4 dimensions: one temporal, and three spatial. 
Well-known examples of this class include principal components analysis (PCA) 
and independent components analysis (ICA).  Both ICA and PCA seek to identify 
separate underlying spatial patterns of activation (“components”) that can be 
recombined (according to a time-varying weighting function) to yield the 
original data. ICA in particular has lead to a number of advancements in our 
understanding of the so-called “resting state” BOLD signal observed in the 
absence of any experimental task.  Sophisticated refinements to these 
techniques allow the spatial factors to enjoy some degree of consistency across 
subjects, either by including subject as a separate dimension of the matrix 
(tensor ICA; Beckmann & Smith, 2005), by using clustering methods to identify 
how subject-specific ICA analyses correspond (Esposito et al 2005), or by 
regressing the time-varying weighting functions found at the group level onto 
the subject-specific datasets (“dual-regression”; Beckmann et al., 2009).  
Identifying the best methods for combining these matrix factorizations across 
subjects remains an important area for future work (e.g., Blumensath et al., 
2013; Manning et al., 2014). 
 
A rapidly-expanding family of matrix factorization methods imposes further 
constraints, in an attempt to improve interpretability. For example, topographic 
factor analysis (TFA; Manning et al., 2014) requires the spatial components to be 
independent spheres. Topographic latent source analysis (TLSA; Gershman et al 
2014) goes further by requiring each of these spherical spatial components to 
have some degree of correspondence with the experimental design. 
 
The aforementioned connectivity techniques can be understood as imposing (as 
in TFA and TLSA) or requiring (PPI, ICA and PCA, at least for statistical 
significance) some degree of spatial homogeneity in the components that are 
recovered. Accordingly, this broad class of connectivity methods may all share a 
number of inferential risks (e.g., O’Reilly et al., 2012; Cole, Smith & Beckmann, 
2010).  First, connectivity methods are even more sensitive to transient head 
motion and various cardiac and respiratory artifacts than standard univariate 
fMRI techniques (van Dijk, Sabuncu & Buckner, 2012; Power et al., 2012). This 
also means that the parametric predictors are measured with error, again 
raising the specter of regression dilution (Frost & Thompson, 2000). Finally, 
spurious alterations of regional connectivity can be provably induced by 
standard preprocessing steps, like global signal regression (Murphy, Birn, 
Handwerker, Jones & Bandettini, 2009; Saad et al., 2012), suggesting that care 
must be taken to ensure the robustness of any result achieved via these 
techniques. 
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Connectivity methods also typically involve implicit biophysical assumptions 
that may produce bias. As one example, the results of fMRI connectivity are 
potentially limited to a specific spectral range. Certainly connectivity changes 
taking the form of coordinated power fluctuations within the theta band (4-7Hz) 
could fail to be detected, given the putative absence of such theta effects in the 
BOLD response (de Munck et al., 2012). Of course, without an explicit 
biophysical model that specifies which frequency bands are responsible for 
changes in connectivity, and how these bands translate into BOLD, it is 
impossible to know how this insensitivity may distort our views of the 
functional connectome (see Hipp & Siegel, 2015, for recent evidence along these 
lines).  As a second example, consider that connectivity and task-induced 
changes in connectivity are in principle wholly independent of mean effects on 
the BOLD response, but that many connectivity and PPI analyses nonetheless 
often rely on region definitions that are informed by (or even wholly based on) 
mean BOLD effects. Again, the true biophysical relationship between changes in 
mean BOLD and connectivity is unknown, but the implicit assumption of a 
relationship could certainly bias the inferences being drawn. As a final example, 
the dependent measure of some connectivity analyses involves the beta 
estimates resulting from regression of one timeseries on another. However, 
these betas reflect the slope relating BOLD across regions, not its correlation. 
Correlation and slope can be independent. The use of slope instead of 
correlation reflects another implicit assumption – namely, that slope is more 
biophysically indicative of connectivity – even though slope can be affected by 
manipulations that have no effect on the mutual information shared across two 
regions. For example, slope but not correlation will be necessarily affected by 
manipulations that shrink the range of one region’s timeseries. Thus, numerous 
implicit biophysical assumptions could color the kinds of inferences currently 
being drawn on the basis of fMRI connectivity methods. 
 
Beyond these issues in sensitivity, evidence of a functional network requires two 
features: the constituent regions must participate in a network, and the activity-
dependence of this network on some function.  Correlation among separate 
regions provides evidence for the first of these features. However, evidence for 
activity-dependence can come from either mean BOLD change, and/or changes 
in correlation (i.e., PPI), across conditions. It is often assumed that both mean 
BOLD change and PPI are necessary to assign function to a network. However, 
metabolic change associated with neural firing and correlations associated with 
neural synchrony are independent, and need not coincide. 
 
Connectivity Analyses – Summary. Though not free of caveats, these connectivity 
methods represent a fundamentally novel (rather than merely “scaled up”) class 
of analysis methods relative to those that are typical of behavioral analysis.  
These methods are likely to enable particularly direct mappings to the cognitive 
level of analysis, given that cognitive processes are most likely to be subserved 
by the action of multi-regional brain networks, rather than independent 
spatially-circumscribed regions. As with any method of such impressive 
flexibility and power, there are ways that connectivity analyses can go wrong. 
But this should not act as a deterrent from their widespread adoption, given 
their potential promise for illuminating the neural basis of cognition. And, as 
described below, these powerful and important connectivity methods have 
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helped to enable other even more drastic departures from the familiar world of 
spatially-circumscribed univariate analyses. 
 
Multivariate Pattern Analysis (MVPA).  
 
In one particularly diverse class of methods, the spatial-contiguity constraints 
typically imposed on fMRI results (for controlling false positive rates) are 
relaxed, or even wholly eliminated. These more general methods allow 
researchers to test for “information” in the BOLD response, and to utilize cross-
validation methods as an alternative means of controlling false positives. These 
techniques can detect information that more standard analyses cannot – that is, 
information other than spatially-contiguous differences in the raw BOLD 
response or its correlation across regions.  For example, information might 
instead be contained in the relative patterns of BOLD or its correlations across 
voxels within some proximity (say, 8mm proximity, as in popular “searchlight” 
style analyses), within some region (e.g., the inferior frontal gyrus; as in ROI-
based approaches) or even within the brain as a whole. 
 
These approaches rely on rapidly developing machine learning techniques 
designed for high-dimensional problems.  Disregarding even the (high) 
likelihood of future enhancements to these approaches, MVPA still promises to 
be of very widespread utility in cognitive neuroscience. This promise derives in 
part from the breadth of questions amenable to MVPA. For example, MVPA can 
help to identify the specificity of information being encoded in the brain (e.g., 
abstract vs. concrete; Wang, Baucom & Shinkareva, 2012); the precision of the 
encoding (e.g., Emrich, Riggali, LaRocque & Postle, 2013); the mutual 
information shared across these encodings (e.g., conjunctive vs. compositional; 
Cole, Etzel, Zacks, Schneider & Braver, 2011), and of course their spatial 
arrangement (sparse/distributed vs. dense/local; Hanson, Matsuka & Haxby, 
2004). Many such representational issues have long been a core aspect of 
cognitive theorizing. MVPA therefore represents a major way that fMRI can be 
used to test (neurally-embellished) cognitive theories. Naselaris (this volume) 
offers a more technical primer on the use of these methods for such purposes.   
 
As just one example of this utility, consider the long-standing hypothesis that 
one source of forgetting is proactive interference (PI), i.e., the blocking, 
suppression, or disruption of a to-be-remembered item by other information 
also in memory. Cognitive theories of PI vary, with some theorists proposing 
that PI serves to disrupt memory encoding (e.g., Wickens, 1970) and others 
proposing that it disrupts retrieval (e.g., Crowder, 1976). These debates may 
have remained unresolved in part because behavioral measures alone are 
insufficient for conclusively locating PI to the encoding or retrieval stage. For 
example, in the “release from PI” paradigm (Wickens, 1970), subjects are tested 
on a multiple lists of items; PI gradually builds when consecutive lists involve 
items of the same category, consequently decreasing memory performance. It is 
thought that such effects reflect reductions in the discriminability of items 
arising from the increasing activation of features shared across items in a 
category, at the expense of features that would distinguish each item from the 
others.  Critically, however, such effects could occur either at encoding or 
retrieval (Öztekin & Badre, 2011). 
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The use of classifiers to analyze distributed patterns of BOLD – one form of 
MVPA – is an fMRI technique which is particularly suited to this problem. MVPA 
can allow one to quantify the degree to which categorical information is being 
represented (e.g., Haxby et al., 2001), even in the absence of any overt response. 
Öztekin & Badre (2011) employed this technique during a release from PI 
paradigm to show that neural representations of the category were 
incrementally less decodable across successive lists at the time of encoding – 
wholly contrary to the notion that increases in the presence of such category-
general features might mediate PI during encoding. The opposite effect was 
observed during retrieval, consistent with the notion that PI is mediated by 
growing interference from category-general features specifically at the time of 
retrieval. Moreover, only these dynamics at the time of retrieval correlated with 
behavioral measures of PI; they did so with significantly greater strength than 
the analogous correlation during encoding. 
 
This example clearly illustrates a case in which behavioral data alone was 
unable to resolve a key cognitive debate; by contrast, fMRI enabled inferences 
about a latent process that were otherwise unobservable.  The requisite neural 
embellishments to cognitive theory were both minimal and straightforward: 
that category-general information content should be linearly decodable from the 
brain. 
 
Multivariate Pattern Analysis – Inferential Risks. The example above illustrates 
only one form of MVPA; there are many (e.g., Norman et al., 2006; Pereira, 
Mitchell & Botvinick, 2009; Kriegeskorte & Kievit, 2013). As a relatively recent 
form of fMRI analysis, our understanding of its limitations and risks is still 
rapidly developing. Several key methodological and inferential variables have 
nonetheless been identified as key to the valid interpretation of MVPA results, 
and a more comprehensive introduction can be found elsewhere (Davis & 
Poldrack, 2013). We list just a few key issues here. 
 
As in many other forms of fMRI analysis, there is a substantial risk for bias. In 
this case the risk arises because the techniques used for MVPA are typically 
highly parameterized, and these parameters can often require tuning. If tuning 
of a classifier’s parameters occurs on the same data set that will be used for 
statistical inference, there is the risk that its accuracy of classification will be 
upwardly biased. This form of accidental look-ahead error is often known as 
“peeking.” 
 
Another potential source of bias is temporal autocorrelation. The BOLD 
responses to any given stimulus will tend to be more similar with those arising 
from any other stimulus when the stimuli occur in the same “run” of the scanner. 
Cross-run cross-validation methods are key for ensuring such temporal 
autocorrelation does not exert undue influence on classification accuracy or 
estimates of representational similarity across stimuli. 
 
A third source of bias is the fact that the direction of differences between 
conditions in MVPA is commonly lost in typical analysis methods (Todd, 
Nystrom & Cohen, 2013).  For example, if a classifier’s accuracy in distinguishing 
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two conditions is merely averaged across subjects, then one may achieve a 
group effect that shows a reliable difference between two conditions even if the 
direction of that difference is completely unsystematic across subjects.   
 
This direction-insensitivity may render MVPA results more prone to subject-
specific and other idiosyncratic confounds, quite distinct from the more 
traditional kinds of confounds that psychologists are accustomed to eliminating.  
Consider a situation where variations in reaction time across two conditions are 
of sole importance, and accuracy differences are considered nuisance variance.  
Statistical inference will be safe at the group level, so long the conditions are 
compellingly matched in aggregate accuracy. However, if scanning with fMRI 
also took place, a significant group-level MVPA result could easily obtain for 
unwanted reasons. In this case, subject-specific classifiers could simply learn to 
recognize the subject-specific direction of differences in accuracy that 
characterize conditions. If the performance of these classifiers was then 
averaged to produce a group-level summary statistic, this group-level average 
would simply show above-chance classification. Such a result could easily, 
though incorrectly, be taken as a difference not attributable to accuracy, since 
accuracy was matched across conditions. 
 
MVPA – Summary. MVPA is typically used to address two types of questions in 
testing a neurally-embellished cognitive theory.  First, it can be used to ask what 
type of information is represented by a particular part of the brain. To address 
this type of question, one must rule out all possible variables correlated with the 
variable of interest (i.e., proxies). Though an issue with any type of experimental 
design (e.g., functional localization), issues unique to MVPA like directionless 
statistics make this particular problem daunting for decoding. The second type 
of question asks what information is available to the system across conditions or 
stages of a process.  In these cases, whether one is decoding the representation 
of interest itself or a proxy for that representation may not bear on the 
inference.  However, this logic rests on the assumption that the relationship 
between proxies and the information of interest holds across the training and 
test conditions.  This assumption can be difficult to support without knowing the 
nature of the proxies, or the mechanism making them diagnostic of the 
underlying representation of interest.  Despite these limitations, MVPA is 
amenable for use in assessing neural embellishments that lie close to the core of 
cognitive theorizing, including issues related to representational specificity, 
precision, compositionality and format.  
 
Topological Structure.  
 
It has been claimed that fMRI cannot help to choose among cognitive theories 
unless each theory specifies “the necessary spatial arrangement of its 
components (rather than their topology)” (Page, 2006).  However, new 
techniques involving the use of graph theoretic measures do permit 
investigations of pure topology in a way that is almost completely independent 
of their spatial arrangement. This, in turn, opens the door for fMRI to inform a 
class of extremely abstract cognitive theories for which any more concrete 
neural embellishment may currently seem too speculative. 
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One useful example is the case of the Global Workspace (GW) Theory of 
consciousness (Baars, 2005). The core claim of this theory amounts to the highly 
abstract notion that consciousness (however that is defined) is enabled by an 
array of cognitive processes that are topologically arranged so as to rapidly 
distribute information about the sensory world. Such a theory might seem 
untestable and abstract.  Yet recent fMRI evidence reveals a picture of the 
conscious brain that is surprisingly and perhaps uniquely consistent with GW 
theory. 
 
Achard et al. (2012) analyzed differences in the patterns of functional 
connectivity in comatose patients and healthy controls, using a series of 
topological measures borrowed from network science (for an introduction see 
Baronchelli, Ferrer-i-Cancho, Pastor-Satorras, Chater & Christiansen, 2013). 
Their topological approach entailed numerous analyses of the structure of 
correlations across more than 400 different neural regions – including metrics 
like the mean correlation, probability of a connection between two regions that 
both connect with a third (i.e., the clustering coefficient), minimum number of 
regions that must be traversed to connect any two regions (i.e., the average path 
length), and many others. Of these myriad measures, the few to reliably 
distinguish the comatose from healthy controls all concerned the relative degree 
of centrality, or “hubness”, of these regions.  
 
Critically for GW theory, there was a robust negative correlation between the 
regions identified as hubs in the healthy controls and those identified as hubs in 
the comatose.  Such a result is tantalizingly consistent with the most naïve 
neural embellishment of GW theory, in that like the proposed cognitive 
topology, network topology might also be closely associated with consciousness.  
More impressively, most of the regions showing a down-regulation in hubness 
in the comatose were located in primary visual cortex. This finding, too, is 
strikingly consistent with the naïve embellishment of GW theory that the neural 
topology of consciousness is specifically relevant to sensory information. 
 
Though this evidence does not conclusively support GW theory, the evidence 
should nonetheless increase our confidence in it. And, more to the present 
purposes, fMRI provided this evidence in a domain where it would be 
impossible to collect behavioral responses whatsoever, in that the key test 
involves subjects who are unresponsive by definition. Finally, we note again that 
the requisite neural embellishment was both minimal and straightforward: one 
needed to assume merely that the topological structure of the cognitive 
operations posited by GW theory should be visible in the topological structure of 
the BOLD response at rest. 
 
Topological Structure – Inferential Risks. Like MVPA, topological structure of 
functional connectivity is a rapidly-developing field, and our understanding of 
its inferential risks are evolving in tandem.  Care must clearly be taken in the 
underlying measures used to calculate connectivity, and the benchmarks with 
which these measures are compared; for example, linear correlation may in 
some cases produce a bias towards the appearance of “small worldness” – a 
topological feature of much theoretical interest in the study of natural networks 
(Zalesky, Fornito & Bullmore, 2012).  
RUNNING HEAD: fMRI and Cognitive Theory 
 28
 
Many topological investigations also pose a tricky problem at the outset: how 
finely should we discriminate neural regions, and which do we discriminate in 
the first place?  It seems likely that topological metrics are sensitive to such 
choices. In the worst-case scenario, this could mean that the neural 
embellishment necessary to conduct a topological test of cognition would 
implicitly require a theory of the functional organization of the entire brain. 
Fortunately, in practice, major topological features do not seem particularly 
sensitive to these choices, at least when the number of regions analyzed is 
sufficiently high (e.g., Craddock, James, Holtzheimer, Hu & Mayberg, 2012). 
 
Finally, we note that replacing regions with networks does not by itself alleviate 
any of the inferential problems that can affect other fMRI approaches, as 
described above. Simply exchanging voxels for networks does not fundamentally 
eliminate concerns about how to draw valid inferences from double 
dissociations or parametric effects, or how to address statistical concerns 
related to power and bias. 
 
Topological Structure – Summary. Topological measures derived from graph 
theory are another relatively recent addition to the set of fMRI analysis tools. 
Like MVPA, these tools offer unique advantages for testing neurally-embellished 
facets of abstract cognitive theories. For example, these new tools make it 
possible to assess whether measures of the connectedness of a hypothesized 
cognitive system corresponds with identical measurements of the neural 
system, without requiring one to specify the spatial location or arrangement of 
the cognitive system’s parts within the brain. There are inferential dangers 
associated with the use of these tools – including the counterintuitive risks 
associated with the use of fairly standard statistics, like linear correlation. 
Nonetheless, this class of analysis methods further extends the role of fMRI in 
testing cognitive theory. 
 
Working from the Bottom Up: Testing Emergentist Theories 
 
We have so far largely focused on cases where a theory was generated in the 
behavioral or purely cognitive domain, and then is embellished so as to be 
tested using neuroscientific data. However, there are a number of models of 
cognition that were initially developed on the basis of neuroscientific, rather 
than behavioral or cognitive data.  These models range from basic neural 
networks to elaborated models of multiple interacting brain systems.  Using this 
more bottom-up approach, the theorist attempts to apply known neuroscientific 
features to the model in an effort to explain or make predictions in the emergent 
cognitive and behavioral domain.  Examples of this include the use of a unified 
set of biologically-inspired learning rules and membrane potential dynamics to 
explain a variety of perceptual, semantic, grammatical, attentional and 
developmental phenomena (e.g., O’Reilly et al. 2012). 
 
One would imagine that such models would be readily amenable to testing with 
fMRI.  However, it has been strikingly difficult to find strong tests of these and 
similar models in the imaging literature. Indeed, far from the compelling 
parametric designs that test quantitative predictions generated by abstract 
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mathematical models, as discussed earlier (e.g., prediction error), tests of these 
neurally-realized models using fMRI have primarily been qualitative and 
indirect.   
 
As one (counter) example, Badre and Frank (2012), utilized a neural model of 
the corticostriatal system to predict fMRI data from a hierarchical control task. 
In this task, subjects learned via trial and error to press one of three buttons 
corresponding to stimuli varying in color, shape, and orientation.  Unbeknownst 
to subjects, there were two conditions. In the hierarchical condition, one 
stimulus dimension deterministically specified which of the others would be 
relevant to the response. In the flat condition, no such rule could apply; instead, 
the mappings of stimulus features to responses were conjunctive and requiring 
simple memorization.   
 
Bottom-up models of the human corticostriatal system imply that learning in the 
hierarchical, but not flat condition should rely crucially on the reinforcement 
learning signals taking place in a more rostral corticostriatal loop (Frank & 
Badre, 2012). However, such models are incapable of generating unique trial-by-
trial predictions for test with fMRI because of the large number of parameters. 
Instead, an intermediate algorithmic model was constructed – in this case, a 
Bayesian “mixture of experts” – that could be used to identifiably link the 
bottom-up neural network model with the trial-by-trial choices made by human 
subjects in the scanner.  
 
Why should there be so few examples in the literature of testing these bottom-
up theories with fMRI? One possibility is that the list of potentially-relevant 
biophysical parameters is generally so large that behavioral simulations must 
cull the list aggressively, so as to remain identifiable and computable in 
reasonable time. In this process, parameters which render BOLD identifiable 
may be incidentally culled or combined. One example of this is the winner-take-
all approximation to the influence of locally-connected inhibitory interneurons 
(e.g., O’Reilly et al, 2012). This shortcut is useful for reducing the parameter 
space in behavioral simulations but, at the same time, complicates the 
development of straightforward predictions for BOLD, which is thought to be 
differentially sensitive to gradient restoration in inhibitory interneurons 
(Buzsáki, Kaila & Raichle, 2007).   
 
Perhaps counterintuitively, more abstract reinforcement learning and Bayesian 
models might actually have more direct mappings to BOLD. Both reinforcement 
learning and Bayesian models tend to foreground the updating of information 
content – whether via Bayesian update, or the Rescorla-Wagner delta rule. Such 
information content changes may be in turn quite directly linked to energetic 
demands. Numerous theories propose that changes in information content 
necessitate the movement of a neural population from one local minimum to 
another within an energetic landscape (e.g., Friston, 2010). If these minima are 
to be locally stable, then transitioning among them must require some degree of 
“hill-climbing” in this landscape. Put another way, changes in information 
content require net energetic input. Thus, models that focus on information 
updating may have advantages in explaining BOLD relative to models which go 
RUNNING HEAD: fMRI and Cognitive Theory 
 30
on to elaborate only the partial subset of the underlying biophysics necessary 
for behavior (but perhaps not BOLD). 
 
Nevertheless, these more elaborated neural theories do have some clear 
advantages. First, they seem to have proven comparatively more successful than 
their abstract counterparts in predicting the relationship of cognition to other 
kinds of neuroscientific data (including the cognitive effects of drugs and 
disease; e.g., Frank, Seeberger & O’Reilly, 2004). Second, they may be more 
amenable than their abstract counterparts to tests with newer fMRI techniques, 
including analyses of connectivity (Horwitz et al., 2005), topology (Eldar, Cohen 
& Niv, 2013) and other multivariate characteristics (Kriegeskorte & Kievit, 
2013).  
 
To summarize, fMRI offers opportunities for testing not only abstract cognitive 
theories, but also those that have been built “bottom-up” – in other words, those 
given a neural implementation in formal mathematical models. Many such 
theories are rooted in microscopic neuronal dynamics and the learning rules 
that govern their alterations with experience, and might therefore be expected 
to have a particularly close relationship with biophysical measures like BOLD. 
This makes the lack of contact between fMRI and these emergentist models all 
the more surprising. One reason for this lack of contact may be that 
energetically-important parameters are often simplified in emergentist models, 
to enable efficient simulations of behavior. Counter-intuitively, models with 
more abstract implementations have faired somewhat better, perhaps because 
they tend to focus on energetically-demanding updating processes (whether of 
action values or of posterior distributions, in reinforcement learning and 
Bayesian models respectively). Nonetheless, we suggest that emergentist 
models may be more easily aligned with pharmacological, connectivity, and 
multivariate fMRI techniques than more abstract cognitive theories and 
associated mathematical models. 
 
 
In Defense of Localization and Reverse Inference 
 
Above we’ve provided several key examples of how fMRI has informed cognitive 
theory in situations where the key behavioral data was either intrinsically 
ambiguous or impossible to acquire in the first place. In every case some form of 
neural embellishment is required. In most cases, the assumptions involved in 
the requisite neural embellishments were natural and straightforward. Of 
course, such straightforward neural embellishments will not always be right. 
Ideally, we would have a principled basis for even more specific kinds of neural 
embellishments.  Basic work in localizing cognitive processes is important in 
this regard – even when such work does not directly inform any cognitive 
theory.  Thus, in answer to Fodor’s question, quite a bit may turn on “precisely 
how far north of the neck” the neural correlates of hypothesized cognitive 
processes are.  We believe this to be the case for two reasons.   
 
First, pure localization work is critically important for enabling other kinds of 
tests of neurally-embellished cognitive theory – including causal tests like those 
enabled by transcranial magnetic stimulation, and tests of high-resolution 
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temporal dynamics like those enabled by EEG.  Many of the limitations of fMRI 
we described above do not pertain to these other technologies, a fact which 
naturally motivates an iterative, convergent approach. 
 
Second, pure localization work may be key for a more principled neural 
embellishment of cognitive theory – as well as for the development of future 
neurally-inspired theories such as those discussed above.  We understand a 
great deal about the brain.  And, one fact is that the brain is not homogenous. 
Rather, individual regions of the brain have features relevant to structure, 
neurochemistry, and interactions with other regions that will impact the type of 
information processing that they do.  Localization can provide important 
information about the involvement of these specific sites during cognition. This 
information is particularly important for building neurally elaborated models 
that predict emergent system behavior.  
 
There are other reasons that the identity of the neural structures engaged by a 
task could be informative, even in the absence of such a model. For example, 
when performed with the appropriate statistical inference (e.g., Bayesian), one 
can probabilistically infer the relation of one task (or cognitive construct) to 
others given activity in a particular part of the brain (Poldrack, 2011; Yarkoni, 
Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen & Wager, 2011; Machery, in press). Such 
approaches demonstrably work, at least in the visual domain (Kay, Naselaris, 
Prenger & Gallant, 2008; Nishimoto et al., 2011), and projects currently 
underway seek to extend this approach to other domains (including, for 
example, Neurosynth: http://www.neurosynth.org). If this optimistic goal can 
be accomplished – by no means a foregone conclusion – the cognitive dynamics 
of naturalistic behavior might some day be probabilistically inferred purely from 
an fMRI scan. The potential for such technology in testing cognitive theory is 
hard to overestimate. 
 
In summary, the science of localizing cognitive functions to neural substrates is 
sometimes derided as irrelevant – as in Fodor’s famously pithy quote: “If the 
mind happens in space at all, it happens somewhere north of the neck. What 
exactly turns on knowing how far north?” (Fodor, 1999). We disagree: the 
neural embellishments required for neuroscientific tests of cognitive theory are 
strongly informed by these localization studies. In addition, localization studies 
may ultimately form the vocabulary used by machine learning algorithms to 
identify the cognitive underpinnings of highly complex or even naturalistic 
behaviors. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have argued that there are many advantages to neurally embellishing a 
cognitive theory.  Most plainly, doing so makes a theory more general and 
falsifiable and more robust to the risks of model mimicry and descriptive 
abstractions. Neural embellishments, like behavioral embellishments commonly 
known as operational definitions, involve specifying a spatiotemporal functional 
form; this involves substantial assumptions.  We have described how these 
embellishments nonetheless enable fMRI to inform diverse cognitive theories in 
domains like planning, learning, working memory, long-term memory, and even 
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consciousness. For each example, we have also noted the many inferential risks 
that accompany these data.  Such limitations are not unique to the use of fMRI, 
but rather advocate an integrative, iterative approach to testing neurally-
embellished cognitive theory.  This approach will necessarily rely in part even 
on the most humdrum “localization” aspects of fMRI research, which can 
ultimately also be informative for cognitive theory, albeit often in empowering 
other more direct experiments.  In conclusion, we think that neural 
embellishment generally, and more specifically the type that is testable using 
fMRI, can be valuable to cognitive scientists, even those whose interests do not 
primarily involve the brain. 
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